as presented in, e.g., the book by Filar and Vrieze [12] . In the current paper we study qualitative SCPR games, i.e., games in which the payoff is the winning probability; in a forthcoming companion paper we will discuss quantitative SCPR games, i.e., games in which the payoff is the capture time.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary definitions and notation. In Section 3 we study the concurrent version of the SCPR game and in Section 4 the sequential version. In Section 5 we discuss connections to several other research areas (for instance recursive games, graphical games and reachability games) and in Section 6 we present concluding remarks and discuss future research directions.
Preliminaries
The SCPR game is played on an undirected, finite, simple and connected graph G = (V, E), where V is the vertex set and E is the edge set. We will use the following notation V n = {(x 1 , ..., x n ) : x 1 ∈ V, ..., x n ∈ V } ,
Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that the cop number of the graph is c (G) = 1. As already mentioned, the game involves three tokens; we will refer to these as either C 1 , C 2 and R or as the first, second and third token, respectively. A starting position is given, i.e., the i-th token (with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is located at x i 0 ∈ V and the game proceeds in turns numbered by t ∈ N; x i t ∈ V indicates the position of the i-th token at the end of the t-th turn. Token movement is always along edges, i.e., x i t+1 ∈ N [x i t ] (the closed neighborhood of x i t ). We will consider two SCPR versions, depending on the order in which tokens are moved.
Concurrent SCPR
In the concurrent version C 1 , C 2 and R are moved simultaneously. C 1 and C 2 are moved by their respective cop players and R is moved according to a probability function which will be descibed a little later.
The locations of the three tokens at some phase of the game are encoded by a vector s = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) (with y i ∈ V for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}); s is called a game position or state. A C 1 -capture state is an s = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) such that y 1 = y 3 . A C 2 -capture state is an s = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) such that y 2 = y 3 and y 1 = y 3 (since a (y, y, y) state is considered a C 1 capture, C 1 is slightly favored; however, because of symetry, reversing the definitions of C i -captures yields essentially the same results). In concurrent SCPR there is a special "en-passant capture", in which a cop and the robber start at opposite ends of the same edge and move in opposite directions; in this case the robber is "swept" by the cop and moved into the cop's destination. After the game reaches a capture state it moves to the terminal state τ and stays there ad infinitum. The state space of SCPR is S = V 3 ∪ {τ } .
We denote by A i (s) the set of moves (or actions) available to the i-th player when the game state is s. Table 1 A play or infinite history of the SCPR game is an infinite sequence s 0 s 1 s 2 ...s n ... of game states; if capture takes place at some finite time, the game moves to the terminal state and stays there for all subsequent turns. The set of all infinite histories is denoted by
Similarly, a finite history is a sequence s 0 s 1 s 2 ...s n of game states and the set of all histories of length n is denoted by
the set of all finite histories is H = ∪ ∞ n=0 H n . We have already mentioned that each cop player moves his respective token. Rather than specifying each move separately, we assume (as is usal in Game Theory) that before the game starts, each cop player selects a strategy which controls all subsequent moves. Despite the fact that there is no robber player, we will assume that robber movement is also controlled by a "strategy", which has been fixed before the game starts and is known to the cop players.
Hence the i-th token (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is controlled by the strategy (conditional probability function):
The above definition is sufficiently general to describe every possible manner of move selection. The following classes of strategies are of particular interest.
1.
A strategy σ i is called Markovian (or positional ) iff σ i (z|s 0 s 1 ...s t ) = σ i (z|s t ) (i.e., the probability of the next move depends only on the current state of the game).
2.
A strategy σ i is called oblivious iff it is Markovian and σ i (z| (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 )) = σ i (z|y i ) (i.e., the probability of the next move of the token depends only on the current location of the token).
3.
A strategy σ i is called deterministic iff, for every s 0 s 1 ...s t ∈ H, σ i (z|s 0 s 1 ...s t ) ∈ {0, 1} (i.e., for every history, the i-th token moves to its next location deterministically).
To simplify presentation, we will often use the following notation for deterministic strategies. We define the deterministic strategy function σ i : H → V as follows: for every finite history 
for C 1 and −Q (s 0 s 1 ....) for C 2 . Also note that both players have an incentive to capture R.
1. If C 1 captures the robber, he receives a total payoff of one (comprising of immediate payoff of one for the capture turn and zero for all other turns); otherwise his total payoff is zero.
2. C 2 never receives positive payoff (even if he captures the robber). However, we have assumed c (G) = 1 and this implies [24] that a single cop will always catch the robber. Hence, if C 2 does not capture R, C 1 will and thus C 2 will receive a negative payoff; this provides the incentive for C 2 to capture R.
Obviously, concurrent SCPR is a stochastic zero sum game. Each player will try to maximize his expected payoff.
Finally, let Γ be a matrix game, i.e., a two-player, zero-sum game with finite action set A i for the i-th player and the expected payoff to the first player being Γ (a 1 , a 2 ) when i-th player plays a i ∈ A i (with i ∈ {1, 2}). As is well known, this game always has a value, which we will denote by Val [Γ (a 1 , a 2 )].
Sequential SCPR
The sequential SCPR game differs from the concurrent game in a single respect: the C 1 , C 2 , R tokens are moved sequentially, rather than simultaneously. Specifically, C 1 is moved on oddnumbered turns and C 2 on even-numbered turns. R is moved at the end of even-numbered turns (i.e., immediately after C 2 is moved). With sequential movement, game states are vectors (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , p) where y i ∈ V indicates (as previously) the position of the i-th token and p ∈ {1, 2} indicates the player whose turn it is to move. Capture states now have the form (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , p) with either y 1 = y 3 or y 2 = y 3 (or both) and the definition and behavior of the terminal state τ are the same as previously. The state space of SCPR now is
Regarding A i (s) (the actions available to the i-th player when the game state is s), note that
In other words, when it is the first player's turn to move, the second player's only legal move is to stay in place. Similarly,
The transition function T is analogous to T but it is modified so that C 2 and R movements are combined in a single (even numbered) turn. The definitions of (finite and infinite) histories and strategies are the same as in the concurrent case, except that we now use the state space S. The meaning of the sets H n , H, H ∞ is analogous to that of H n , H, H ∞ . The strategies σ i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are defined in the same manner as in the concurrent case (again, for deterministic moves we introduce the deterministic functions σ i ).
Payoff of the sequential qualitative SCPR game is defined in exactly the same manner as in the concurrent case. Again, sequential SCPR is a zero sum game and each player will try to maximize his expected payoff.
Concurrent SCPR
In this section we establish that concurrent SCPR has a value which can be computed by value iteration. We first consider the case in which R is controlled by a general probability function σ 3 ("random robber") and then examine in greater detail the case in which σ 3 is oblivious deterministic ("oblivious deterministic robber").
Random Robber
Suppose the game starts at position s ′ 0 , C i moves according to strategy σ i (for i ∈ {1, 2}) and R moves according to a fixed and known stratey σ 3 . Every triple (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) induces a probability measure on H ∞ , the set of all infinite game histories. Hence
is well defined 2 . J (σ 1 , σ 2 |s ′ 0 ) is the expected payoff to C 1 ; the expected payoff to C 2 is −J (σ 1 , σ 2 |s ′ 0 ). It is easily seen that J (σ 1 , σ 2 |s ′ 0 ) = Pr ("C 1 wins"|"the game starts at s ′ 0 and, for i ∈ {1, 2} , C i uses σ i ") .
For fixed initial position s ′ 0 and robber function σ 3 , the concurrent qualitative SCPR game is a stochastic zero-sum game [12] with expected payoff J (σ 1 , σ 2 |s ′ 0 ). We always have
if the two sides of (4) are equal, we define the value of the game (when started at s
v will denote the vector of values for all starting states, i.e., v = (v (s)) s∈S . Given some ε ≥ 0, we say that: (i) a strategy σ # 1 is ε-optimal (for C 1 ) iff
2 In all subsequent analysis and notation, the dependence on the fixed and known σ 3 is suppressed.
(ii) a strategy σ # 2 is ε-optimal (for C 2 ) iff
A 0-optimal strategy is also called simply optimal. Now we can state the two main results concerning concurrent SCPR.
Theorem 3.1 For every graph G = (V, E) with c (G) = 1 and every s ∈ V 3 , the concurrent SCPR game starting at s has a value v (s), where v is the smallest (componentwise) solution to the following system of equations
C 2 has a Markovian optimal strategy; for every ε > 0, C 1 has a Markovian ε-optimal strategy.
Proof. The theorem follows immediately from results of [12] . 
and v (1) , v (2) , ... by the following recursion
Then v = lim i→∞ v (i) exists and, for every s ∈ V 3 , v (s) is the value of the qualitative concurrent SCPR game played on G, starting from s. 
Oblivious Deterministic Robber
Suppose that σ 3 is oblivious deterministic. In this case, the results of Section 3.2 can be sharpened and, in a sense, simplified. Before presenting these new results in rigorous form, let us describe them informally.
1. Suppose first that a game is played (on a cop-win graph) between a single cop and an oblivious deterministic robber. We will prove that there exists a Markovian deterministic cop strategy σ * by which the cop can capture the robber in minimum time.
2. Next consider two cops and an oblivious deterministic robber. We will prove that the extension of σ * to SCPR is optimal for both cops. More specifically, neither cop loses anything by using it; and one of the two will win with probability one.
Let us now formalize the above ideas. We pick any graph G = (V, E) with c (G) = 1 and any oblivious deterministic robber strategy σ 3 and keep these fixed for the remainder of the discussion. Further, let A denote the set of all functions σ : V 2 → V with the restriction that
. In other words, A is the set of legal Markovian deterministic cop strategies for the "classic" CR game of one cop and one robber. Now pick some σ ∈ A and play the game with starting positions x 1 0 = y 1 ∈ V (for the cop) and x 3 0 = y 3 ∈ V (for the robber). The following sequence (dependent on σ, y 1 , y 3 ) of cop and robber positions will be produced:
let T σ (y 1 , y 3 ) be the capture time, i.e., the smallest t such that
Lemma 3.3 Let T (0) (x, x) = 0 (for all x ∈ V ) and T (0) (x, y) = ∞ (for all (x, y) ∈ V 2 ) and perform the following iteration for i = 1, 2, ... and for all (x, y) ∈ V 2 :
Then the limits lim
exist for all (x, y) ∈ V 2 . Furthermore, letting σ * (x, y) = lim i→∞ σ (i) (x, y) and T * (x, y) = min σ∈A T σ (x, y), we have
Proof. The proof is based on a standard dynamic programming argument. First note that T * (x, y) < ∞, for every (x, y) ∈ V 2 . This is true because C 1 can reach any vertex of V in at most |V | − 1 steps; so C 1 can simply go to y 3 |V | (the known location of R at time t = |V |) and wait there. Now we will prove by induction that
For n = 0, T * (x, y) = 0 implies x = y and, from initialization, T * (x, x) = 0 = T (0) (x, x). Now suppose that (11) holds for n = 1, 2, ..., k and consider the case n = k + 1, in which T * (x, y) = k + 1 is the smallest number of steps in which C 1 can reach R. This also means that (i) there exists some x ′ ∈ N [x] from which C 1 can reach R (who now starts at σ 3 (y)) in k steps and (ii) there does not exist any x ′′ ∈ N [x] from which C 1 can reach R in m < k steps (because then C 1 starting at x could reach R in m + 1 < k + 1 steps). In other words
and the induction is completed. It also follows that
which implies that both lim i→∞ T (i) (x, y) and lim i→∞ σ (i) (x, y) exist. Taking the limit in (8)- (9) we get the optimality equations
hence, it is clear from the iteration (8)- (9) that T σ * (x, y) = T * (x, y), for all (x, y) ∈ V 2 . Now let us use σ * of Lemma 3.3 to define a strategy σ * i for C i (i ∈ {1, 2}) as follows:
Then the following holds.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose SCPR is played on a G with c (G) = 1 and the robber is controlled by an oblivious deterministic strategy σ 3 . Then, for every (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) ∈ V 3 , σ * i is an optimal strategy for C i (i ∈ {1, 2}) and v (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. The key fact is this: when σ 3 is oblivious deterministic, the players C 1 and C 2 interact only at the last phase of the game, when R is captured. In effect each cop plays a "decoupled" classic CR game, in which σ * of Lemma 3.3 guarantees capture in minimum time. Of course in the full SCPR game there is always the possibility that the other cop can capture R at an earlier time. Hence the best the i-th cop can do is to attempt to capture R at the earliest possible time and an optimal strategy to this end is σ * i ; he has no incentive to deviate from σ * i (by using another deterministic or probabilistic strategy) because this can never reduce his projected capture time. Hence σ * i is optimal for the i-th cop. Since σ * 1 , σ * 2 and σ 3 are deterministic, the outcome of the game is also deterministic; in particular {0, 1} ∋ Pr "C 1 captures R"|"game starts at y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , for i ∈ {1, 2} ,
The proof is complete. From the above theorem we get the following.
Corollary 3.5 Suppose SCPR is played on a G with c (G) = 1 and the robber is controlled by an oblivious deterministic strategy σ 3 . Then, ∀s ∈ S, we have
= min
Proof. Since σ 3 is deterministic, Pr (T (s, (a 1 , a 2 , σ 3 (s))) |s, a 1 , a 2 ) = 1. Hence
Since σ * 1 and σ * 2 are also deterministic, at every turn of the game they produce an action with probability one. Hence there exist actions
Since, from Theorem 3.4, v (s) ∈ {0, 1}, we consider two cases.
Suppose that concurrent SCPR is played on the graph of Figure 3 .2, starting from the state (2, 6, 1) and the robber is controlled by the σ 3 indicated in the following table. Table 2 For every game state not listed above the robber stays in place, i.e., x
. Now consider what the first moves of C 1 and C 2 should be. They know that R will move into vertex 4; C 1 can either stay at 2 or move into 3; C 2 can either stay at 6 or move into 5. After the first move is completed, the possible game states are the following. Table 2 It is easy to check (from the respective σ 3 values) that for s 1 = (2, 6, 4) and s 1 = (3, 5, 4) the capturing cop is C 1 , while for s 1 = (2, 5, 4) and s 1 = (3, 6, 4) the capturing cop is C 2 . Hence the game can be written out as the following matrix game
It is easy to compute, using standard methods, that the optimal strategies for this game are Pr (a 1 = 2) = Pr (a 2 = 3) = . This implies that the optimal strategies σ * 1 and σ * 2 are randomized, despite the fact that σ 3 is deterministic (but not oblivious).
Many similar exmaples can be constructed. The important point is this: when σ 3 is not oblivious, C 1 moves can influence future R moves and this influence cannot be observed by C 2 (since moves are performed simultaneously); of course the same is true for C 2 moves.
Sequential SCPR
In this section we establish that sequential SCPR has a value which can be computed by value iteration. The results are very similar to the ones of Section 3 so they are given without proofs.
Theorem 4.1 For every graph G = (V, E) with c (G) = 1 and every s ∈ V 3 , the sequential SCPR game starting at s has a value v (s), where v is the smallest (componentwise) solution to the following system of equations
C 2 has a Markovian optimal strategy; for every ε > 0, C 1 has a Markovian ε-optimal strategy..
Theorem 4.2 Given some graph
Then v = lim i→∞ v (i) exists and, for every s ∈ V 3 , v (s) is the value of the qualitative sequential SCPR game played on G, starting from s. Theorem 4.3 Suppose SCPR is played on a G with c (G) = 1 and the robber is controlled by an oblivious deterministic strategy σ 3 . Then, for every (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) ∈ V 3 , σ * i is an optimal strategy for C i (i ∈ {1, 2}) and v (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Corollary 4.4 Suppose SCPR is played on a G with c (G) = 1 and the robber is controlled by an oblivious deterministic strategy σ 3 . Then, ∀s ∈ S, we have
Related Work
In this section we present work which is related to both the SCPR and other variants of the CR game.
We have already mentioned that the interested reader can find useful references to the CR literature in the book [30] by Nowakowski and Bonato. The CR literature is mainly oriented to graph theoretic and combinatorial considerations. Indeed CR can be seen as a combinatorial game. On the topic of combinatorial games, the reader can consult the introductory text [1] as well as the classic book (in four volumes) [5] by Berlekamp and Conway. We also find interesting generalizations of the CR game in the papers [8, 9] by A. Bonato and G. MacGillivray.
We believe that "classic" game theory offers a natural framework for the analysis of CR games 3 . In particular, as already seen, we consider SCPR as a stochastic game. Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [33] . A classic book on the subject is [12] , which also contains a rich bibliography; see also [28] .
A type of stochastic game which is especially related to CR games is the recursive game, in which whenever a non-zero-payoff is received the play immediately moves to an absorbing state. The similarity to SCPR is obvious. Recursive games were introduced by Everett [14] . While we have not used results from the recursive game theory in the current paper, we believe this may turn out to be a fruitful connection.
Let us now mention a construction which has been used in several "classic" CR papers [8, 9, 18] . Suppose that a "classic" CR game is played between one cop and one robber on the undirected graph G = (V, E). We now construct the game digraph D = (S, A), where the vertex set is S = V 2 and the arc set A encodes possible vertex-to-vertex transitions. Then a play of the CR game can be understood as a walk on D; the cop wins if he can force the walk to pass through a vertex of the form (x, x). Hence CR can be seen as a game in which the two players push a token along the arcs of the digraph. As pointed out in [8, 9] many CR variants and several other pursuit games on graphs can be formulated in a similar manner. It turns out that such "digraph games" have been studied by several researchers and the related literature is spread among many communities. The earliest such work of which we are aware is [4] . Other early examples of this iterature are the papers [26, 3, 13, 34] . But probably the most widespread application of this point of view is in the literature of reachability games [6] and, more generally, ω-regular games [27] . In a reachability game two players take turns moving a token along the arcs of a digraph; player 1 wants to place the token on one of the nodes of a subset of the digraph vertices while player 2 wants to avoid this event. Many variations of reachability games have been studied, e.g., stochastic [10] , concurrent [2] , n-player [11] etc. The connection to CR games is obvious and, given the voluminous literature on reachability games it seems probable that it contains results of value to CR researchers.
Conclusion
We have introduced the game of selfish cops and passive robber (SCPR game) and established its basic properties, namely the existence of value and optimal strategies. In the current paper we have examined qualitative variants of the game, i.e., these in which the goal of the cops is simply to capture the robber. In a forthcoming paper we will examine quantitative variants, in which the goal is to capture the robber in the shortest possible time.
Several additional issues merit further study and will be the subject of our future research. For example, while we have currently limited ourselves to the study of cop-win graphs, i.e. with c (G) = 1, we believe some of our results hold for graphs with c (G) > 1 as well. Furthermore, we have formulated SCPR as a zero-sum game; but reasonable formulations as a non-zero-sum game are also possible and we conjecture that these may lead to qualitatively different results. Finally, if we remove the assumption that the robber is passive and deal instead with the situation of two selfish robbers and a robber actively trying to avoid capture, we are left with a three-player game, which we intend to study in the future.
